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LISTING OF ALL PARTIES TO PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the parties to the action in the District Court below
are listed as follows:
Plaintiff:
Surety Life Insurance Company, a Utah corporation.
Defendants:
Melvin K. Burningham, Howard H. Hucks and Markwest
Corporation, a California corporation.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 890594-CA
v.
Priority No. 16
STEPHEN W. RUPP, TRUSTEE,
as successor in interest to
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this case is vested in this Court pursuant
to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rules 3 and 42 (1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1)

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying

appellee Melvin K. Burningham's motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the summary judgment entered
against him.
2)

Whether

the trial

court erred

in denying

Melvin K.

Burningham's motion to set aside the summary judgment on grounds
that genuine issues of material fact exist.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1)

The trial court has considerable discretion in ruling on

a motion to set aside a judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and is subject to reversal only where a clear
1

abuse of discretion is shown.

Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193,

1994 (Utah 1984); Van Per Stappen v. Van Per Stappen, 166 Utah Adv.
Rep. 58, 59 (Ct. App. 1991).

Where the issue under Rule 60(b) is

whether a judgment is void, the trial court's decision not to
vacate becomes a question of law upon which no deference is given
to the trial court.

State Pep't of Social Servs. v. Vijil, 784

P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989); Van Per Stappen, 166 Utah Adv. Rep. at
59.
2)

Where the issue on appeal is whether the trial court

erred in denying a motion to set aside the summary judgment on
grounds that issues of fact exist, Utah appellate courts apply "the
same standard incumbent on the trial court: the grant of such a
motion (or affirmance thereof) is appropriate only where there
exist no genuine issues of fact relevant to the disposition of the
claim underlying the motion."

Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794, 797

(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting L & A Prywall, Inc. v. Whitmore
Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah 1980)).
The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue
of material fact is, of course, on the moving party.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

See, e.g.,

However, once the

moving party has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party to designate "specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial."

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.x

It is

essential to note that the non-moving party in summary judgment
1

The Utah Court of Appeals has expressly approved of and
adopted the United States Supreme Court's approach to summary
judgment set out in Celotex. See, e.g., Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Robinson v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
2

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts."

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

The central inquiry

is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law."

Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case

The nature of this appeal is straightforward: Melvin K.
Burningham ("Burningham") appeals the trial court's order denying
his motion to vacate or set aside the summary judgment.
12, 1989 Order, attached as Addendum No. 1.)
inappropriately

addresses

(See June

However, Burningham

issues and makes

arguments

in his

appellate brief on behalf of the other defendants, Markwest
Corporation ("Markwest") and Howard H. Hucks ("Hucks"), president
of Markwest.

Neither Markwest nor Hucks appealed the same trial

court's order denying their various motions.
appealed the trial court's order.

Only Burningham

(See Notice of Appeal, R. 344.)

In an order signed by Judge Gregory K. Orme on August 5, 1991,
the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that Burningham was the only
defendant to have appealed the trial court's order. (See August 5,
1991 Utah Court of Appeals Order, p. 1, attached as Addendum No.
2.)

The same order also determined that because Burningham filed

a bankruptcy petition after he appealed the trial court's order,
trustee Stephen W. Rupp would be substituted as the appellant for
Burningham. This matter was thereafter styled as follows: "Surety
3

Life Insurance Company, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Stephen W. Rupp,
Trustee,

as

successor

in

Defendant and Appellant."
II.

interest

to Melvin

K.

Burningham,

(See Addendum No. 2.)

Course of Proceedings/Relevant Facts

Although the issues and the nature of this case are relatively
simple, the record of the proceedings below in comparison is
unfortunately long and convoluted.

As evidenced in Burninghamfs

brief, Burningham and the other defendants have filed an avalanche
of pleadings.

Surety Life undertakes herein to present with

clarity the course of proceedings in this case and the relevant
facts for this Court's review.
On or about January 9, 1987, Burningham and Markwest executed
a promissory notes and trust deed in the sum of $1,000,000 payable
to appellee Surety Life.

(R. 7-35).

This loan was for permanent

financing of a recreational vehicle and commercial storage project
("Draper Project") Markwest was developing on property located in
Draper, Utah.

The trust deed covered the Draper property, which

Burningham refers to in his brief as the "Draper R.V. & Commercial
Park."
Burningham, Markwest and Hucks also executed

a guaranty

agreement which unconditionally guaranteed repayment of all sums
payable under the promissory note.

(Attached as Addendum No. 3.)

The terms of the guaranty agreement provide for a waiver of
defenses and consent to the entry of judgment.

The agreement

states, in pertinent part, the following:
[The Guarantors] [acknowledge and agree
that the Beneficiary [Surety Life] may pursue
its rights and remedies under this Agreement
notwithstanding any other guaranty of or

4

security for the indebtedness evidenced by the
Note, the Deed of Trust and the other Loan
Documents.
The Guarantors authorize the
Beneficiary, at its sole option, without
notice or demand and without affecting the
liability of the Guarantors under this Agreement, to foreclose the Deed of Trust and the
interests in real property secured thereby
judicial or nonjudicial sale, and the Guarantors hereby waive any defense to the recovery
against Guarantors of any deficiency after a
non-judicial sale . . . .
(See Addendum No. 3, 1f 6. )
Surety Life was not involved in any way in the development or
additional

financing of the Draper Project.

Markwest later

obtained construction financing for the Draper project from United
Savings & Loan Association ("United Savings").

Surety Life had no

involvement or connection whatsoever with United Savingsf role in
the financing and management of the Draper Project. (See Statement
of Facts in Surety Life's Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss Complaint, attached as Addendum No. 4.)
When Burningham, Markwest and Hucks failed to pay the amounts
due under the promissory note, Surety Life foreclosed on the Draper
property securing the note and noticed a trustee's sale for
February 1, 1988.

On the day of the scheduled trustee's sale,

Draper RV & Commercial Storage, Melvin K. Burningham and his son,
Wayne Burningham ("plaintiffs"), filed a complaint against Surety
Life and United Savings and simultaneously filed a motion for a
temporary restraining order to block the trustee's sale. The court
issued the temporary restraining order that morning. Plaintiffs'
complaint against Surety Life and United Savings was based on a
"lender liability" theory that United Savings had taken over the
project and operated it improperly. (See Transcript of Proceedings
5

before District Court, p. 13.)

On June 22, 1988, the court

dissolved the temporary restraining order and denied plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction.

Two months later, the court

dismissed plaintiffs1 action against Surety Life. (See 6/22/88 and
8/26/88 Orders, attached collectively as Addendum No. 5.)
The Draper property was finally sold pursuant to a trustee's
sale on July 27, 1988, for $700,000.

One day prior to the

scheduled

in the United

sale, Wayne Burningham

filed

States

Bankruptcy Court an involuntary chapter 11 petition on behalf of
"Draper R.V. & Commercial Storage, a Utah Partnership."
No. 6.)

(Addendum

Shortly, after the trustee's sale, Wayne Burningham,

appearing on behalf of Draper R.V. & Commercial Storage, filed a
motion in the Bankruptcy Court to show cause asserting that Surety
Life had proceeded with the trustee's sale in violation of the
chapter 11 automatic stay.

(Addendum No. 7.)

Because Draper R.V. & Commercial Storage alleged a possessory
interest in the Draper property, Surety Life moved the Bankruptcy
Court for relief from the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. §
362.

After two days of trial in December of 1988, the Bankruptcy

Court found that the Draper property was not property of the
bankruptcy estate and that Surety Life was therefore entitled to
relief from the stay.

The Bankruptcy Court also determined that

the foreclosure sale was not a violation of the stay.

After

careful review of an independent fee appraiser and report and
testimony, the Bankruptcy Court also made a finding of fact that
the value of the Draper property was $700,000. An order granting
relief from the stay was later signed and entered by the Bankruptcy

6

Court.

(See Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and Order

Granting Relief from Stay, attached as Addendum No. 8.)
Surety Life then brought action against Burningham and the
other defendants to recover the balance due on the note following
foreclosure in reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 51-1-32 (1953) and in
reliance on the guaranty agreement.

(See R. 2-42.)

Surety Life

later amended its complaint to consolidate its cause of action on
the guaranty agreement with its action for a deficiency judgment.
(R. 52-58; 103-104; 133-35.) Because Hucks and Markwest failed to
respond to Surety Life's complaint, a default judgment was entered
against these defendants.

(R. 145-46. )

On March 8, 1989, Surety Life filed a motion for summary
judgment against Burningham based on the terms of the guaranty
agreement.

(R. 155-60. )

Sometime later, Surety Life filed a

notice to submit for decision and request for ruling on the grounds
that Burningham had not filed a response.

(R. 186-87.)

On that

very day, Surety Life received an affidavit of Wayne Burningham
that attempted to raise a question as to the fair market value of
the Draper property.

(R. 188-91.)

Burningham never filed a

memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to Surety Life's
motion for summary judgment.
In April of 1989, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Surety Life and against Burningham.

(R. 246.)

Shortly

thereafter, Burningham and the other defendants, who already had
default judgments entered against them, filed a counterclaim,
alleging that Surety Life was jointly liable with United Savings
for various lender liability claims.

(R. 248-58.)

These claims

were precisely the same claims that Burningham and Draper RV &
7

Commercial Storage had asserted against Surety Life and United
Savings which were dismissed as to Surety Life.

(R. 260-62; 270-

72; 286-87. )
Burningham also filed a Motion to Vacate or Set Aside the
Summary Judgment.

Following a hearing on this motion and on all

other motions filed by the defendants, the trial court entered an
order denying Burninghamfs motion to set aside the summary judgment
entered against him, denying Hucks motion to set aside the default
judgment entered against him, and denying Markwest's and Hucks1
motion to file an answer and counterclaim.

(Addendum No. 1.)

Burningham then filed a notice of appeal of the summary
judgment granted against him.

Surety Life filed a motion to

dismiss Burninghamfs appeal on the grounds that Burningham had
failed to comply with any of the rules governing the filing of
appeals and disregarded several warnings from the Utah Supreme
Court and Utah Court of Appeals that failure to cure these defaults
would result in dismissal of the appeal.

(See Addendum, No. 9.)

On December 20, 1989, Burningham informed this Court that on June
29, 1989, he had filed a Chapter 7 Petition in Bankruptcy.

(See

January 9, 1990 Utah Court of Appeals Notice of Status Conference,
attached as Addendum No. 10.)

This Court then instructed the

parties to file memoranda explaining why the appeal should or
should not be dismissed as moot based on Burninghamfs bankruptcy
filing.

(See February 26, 1991 Utah Court of Appeals Notice of Sua

Sponte Consideration by the Court for Summary Disposition, attached
as Addendum No. 11.)

Memoranda were filed and a scheduling

conference presided over by Judge Orme was held on August 1, 1991.
Judge Orme denied Surety Life's motion to dismiss the appeal and
8

required Burninghamfs appellate brief to be filed by September 16,
1991 and Surety Life's reply brief to be filed a month later. (See
Addendum No. 2.) After a notice of default was issued, Burningham
filed a brief.

Surety Life now files its response brief to

Burningham's appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Burninghamfs analysis in this appeal is at best confusing.
The issues he raises concerning the non-appealing defendants are
impertinent to this Court's decision. Notwithstanding the sinuous
procedural history in this case and the mixing of irrelevant
issues, resolution of the appropriate issues raised in Burningham's
behalf is clear.
There is no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Burningham's motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the summary judgment.

The

chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed on behalf of Draper R.V. &
Commercial Storage, did not stay the action brought by Surety Life
against Burningham.

Because the bankruptcy petition was filed

under chapter 11, not chapter 13, the automatic stay provision of
11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) which Burningham cites to has no application in
this case.

The language in chapter 11 and the sizeable case

authority applying chapter 11 conclusively establish that the
chapter 11 automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not extend
to co-debtor partners.
Moreover, Hucks' reliance on the filing of the bankruptcy
petition filed on behalf of R.V. & Storage did not justify relief
sought by Burningham.

Hucks is not a party to this appeal and his
9

so-called reliance has no bearing on the merits of Burninghamfs
appeal.
The record is devoid of a single genuine issue of fact
regarding Burningham's competency
agreement.

to enter into the guaranty

Burningham does not carry his burden and does not set

forth sufficient evidence to make out a triable issue of fact on
his competency.

Because a trial would be useless, Surety Life is

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Contrary to Burninghamfs argument, the market value of the
subject property at the time of the trustee's sale is not at issue
in this case, let alone a genuine issue of material fact.
case

is not

merely

a

deficiency

action,

but

an

This

action

on

Burningham's unconditional guarantee to repay a promissory note.
By agreement, Burningham waived all defenses and agreed to the
entry of judgment.
Even if the fair market value of the subject property was an
issue, principles of collateral estoppel bar the issue from again
being litigated. The Bankruptcy Court, following two days of trial
and based on competent independent appraisal reports and testimony,
made a finding of fact that the fair market value of the Draper
property was $700,000.
Burningham fails to state any grounds for a reversal of the
trial court's order denying Burningham's motion to set aside the
summary judgment entered against him.

10

ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in
denying Burninghamfs Utah R. Civ. Pro. 60(b) Motion
to Set Aside the Summary Judgment.

Burningham presents two alternative grounds to support his
position that the trial court erred in denying his motion to set
aside the summary judgment.

Burningham first asserts that the

filing of a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on behalf of Draper R.V.
& Commercial Storage, a Utah Partnership, stayed the action brought
by Surety Life against Burningham and the other defendants.2

In

the alternative, Burningham claims that reliance on the Bankruptcy
petition filed on behalf of R.V. & Commercial Storage constituted
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Neither of these grounds compel this Court to determine
that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying
Burningham's motion to set aside the summary judgment.
A.

The automatic stay provisions of
Chapters 11 and 13 of the Federal
Bankruptcy Code did not apply to
Burningham.

Burningham erroneously represents that he, along with the
other defendants, was a co-debtor with Draper R.V. & Commercial
Storage under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The
bankruptcy petition filed on behalf of Draper R.V. & Commercial
Storage was filed under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, not

2

A1though Burningham does not state so, he presumably advances
this argument under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
11

chapter 13. Thus, automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a)
which Burningham cites to has no application in this case.3
Unlike chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, the provisions of
chapter 11 are devoid of any specific language extending the
automatic stay to co-debtors or partners of the debtor.

Section

362(a) of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides that
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy operates as a stay of only
the debtor:
§ 362. Automatic stay.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section, a petition filed under section
301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15
U.S.C. 78(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, o f —
(1) the commencement or continuation,
including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other
action or proceeding against the debtor that
was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under this title
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor
or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the
case under this title;

3

Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code provides in

part:
§ 1301.

Stay of action against codebtor

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b)
and (c) of this section, after the order for
relief under this chapter, a creditor may not
act, or commence or continue any civil action,
to collect all or any part of a consumer debt
of the debtor from any individual that is
liable on such debt with the debtor, or that
secured such debt . . . .
11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1991).
12

(3) any act to obtain possession of
property of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of
the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien
to the extent that such lien secures a claim
that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this
title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the
debtor that arose before the commencement of
the case under this title against any claim
against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a
proceeding before the United States Tax Court
concerning the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1991) (emphasis added).

"Debtor" is defined as

a "person or municipality concerning which a case under this title
has been commenced.

11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1991).

A "person"

includes individuals, partnerships and corporations.

11 U.S.C. §

101(31) (1991). The language of chapter 11 limits automatic stays
to debtors only; there is no provision that expressly, or even
impliedly, authorizes automatic stays against co-debtors.
A well-established proposition in bankruptcy law is that the
chapter 11 automatic stay does not extend to co-debtors. Citing a
long string of case citations, the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Utah explicitly held in In re Arrow Huss, Inc.,
51 Bankr. 853 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985), that chapter 11 does not
prohibit actions against co-debtors:

13

It is well settled that Section 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which stays actions against
the debtor and against property of the estate,
does not forbid actions against its nondebtor
principals, partners, officers, employees, coobligors, guarantors, or sureties. The legislative history shows that Congress may have
considered the issue of a general stay of
actions against guarantors in reorganization
cases, but apparently rejected such a blanket
stay and limited co-debtor stays to Chapter
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1301. As enacted, Chapter 11 contains no specific provision authorizing stays against nondebtor codefendants.
Id. at 856 (citations & footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

In

holding that the automatic stay does not apply to the principal of
two debtor entities, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York states in language especially germane
to this appeal:
For bankruptcy purposes the partnership debtor
is a separate and distinct entity from its
partners. . . . Hence, a Chapter 11 debtor
partnership is not entitled to enjoin state
court suits commenced against partners individually.
In re Autobahn Classics, Inc., 29 Bankr. 625, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983) (emphasis added) (citing Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Bear, 276 U.S.
215 (1928); In re Dress Shop, 516 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1975); Aboussie
Bros., 8 Bankr. 302 (E.D. Mo. 1981)).

Finally, one of the premier

authorities on bankruptcy drives home the prescript that the
chapter 11 automatic stay does not extend to co-debtor partners:
[the automatic stay] does not, however, extend
to separate legal entities such as corporate
affiliates, partners in debtor partnerships,
or to co-defendants in pending litigation.
2 K. Clee, R. Levin, H. Miller and P. Murphy, Collier on Bankruptcy
1f 362.04 (15th ed. 1979) (emphasis added) (citing Lynch v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1983); Williford v.
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Armstrong

World

Indus., Inc., 715

F.2d

124

(4th Cir.

1983);

Aboussie Bros. Constr. Co. v. United Missouri Bank, 8 Bankr. 302
(E.D.

Mo. 1981); Nevada Nat'l Bank v. Casgul of Nevada (In re

Casgul of Nevada, Inc.), 22 Bankr. 65 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)).
Contrary to Burninghamfs contention, the bankruptcy petition
filed

on behalf of Draper R.V.

& Commercial

Storage did

not

automatically stay Surety Life's action against Burningham. Hence,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding with the
action and entering summary judgment against Burningham.
B.

Hucks' reliance on the filing of the
Bankruptcy Petition filed on behalf
of R.V. & Commercial Storage did not
justify the relief requested by
Burningham.

Burningham's argument that reliance on the Bankruptcy petition
filed on behalf of R.V. & Commercial Storage constituted excusable
neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
disingenuous.

To support his contention, Burningham refers soley

to Hucks' affidavit which states that because Hucks relied on
Surety Life's motion for relief from the stay, he subsequently
delayed filing his answer to Surety Life's complaint.
Hucks is not a party to this appeal.

However,

Any "excusable neglect" with

regard to Hucks or any defendants other than Burningham has no
bearing on Burningham's Rule 60(b) argument on appeal.

Burningham

sets forth no other facts on appeal to support his contention that
the trial court abused its discretion under Rule 60(b) in refusing
to set aside the summary judgment entered against Burningham.
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II.

Burningham fails to state genuine issues of material fact
that would preclude summary judgment for Surety Life as
a matter of law.

Burningham

proffers

the

following

as genuine

issues of

material fact: 1) whether Burningham was incompetent to sign the
guaranty and 2) what was the market value of the property at the
time of the trustee's sale.

As shown below, neither of these

issues present genuine issues of material fact that preclude the
trial court's entry of summary judgment against Burningham.
A.

No genuine issue of material fact
exists regarding Burningham's competency .

Burningham fails to muster any evidence, let alone sufficient
evidence, to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding
Burningham's competency.

When evaluating whether the evidence

reveals a genuine issue of material fact, the appellate court must
consider the eventual standard of proof at trial.

Robinson v.

Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. of App.
1987).

A party asserting incapacity to enter into a contract has

the burden of proving such by clear and convincing evidence.
Jimenez v. O'Bricm, 117 Utah 82, 213 P.2d 337, 339-40 (1949); see
also Hendricksen v. Simper, 24 Arizona App. 415, 539 P.2d 529, 532
(1975).

The Utah Supreme Court has outlined in clear terms the

standard that constitutes competency to contract:
In ordinary contracts the test is, Were [sic]
the mental faculties so deficient or impaired
that there was not sufficient power to comprehend the subject of the contract, its nature
and its probable consequences, and to act with
discretion in relation thereto, or with relation to the ordinary affairs of life?
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Jimenez, 213 P.2d at 339 (quoting Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148
P. 433, 438 (1914)). Because Burningham does not carry his burden
and set forth sufficient evidence to make out a triable issue of
fact regarding his capacity to comprehend the subject of the
guaranty agreement and its probable consequences, a trial would be
useless and Surety Life is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law.
There is not a shred of evidence in the record that Burningham
was incompetent for health reasons, as he contends, or otherwise,
when Burningham signed the guaranty agreement.

Burningham even

freely admits that there "is nothing in the record to explain
defendant Melvin Burninghamfs health."

(See Appellants' Brief, p.

20. ) To support his contention of incompetency, Burningham merely
offers excuses as to why the record lacks such evidence and
misconstrues facts to fashion a vague impression that he was not
fully competent when he signed the guaranty agreement.

As shown

below none of these arguments rise to the level of a triable or
genuine issue of material fact.
Burningham first suggests that for reasons explained in an
affidavit filed with the trial court, his counsel did not have time
to proffer evidence to support Burningham's incompetency allegation.

This assertion is specious.

The affidavit that Burningham

refers to was submitted to the trial court to justify Burninghamfs
counsel's dilatory conduct on behalf of all the defendants in
responding to the trial court's various orders and Surety Life's
motions.

The affidavit does not mention, or even suggest, that

counsel for Burningham lacked sufficient time to muster evidence to
support his position by affidavit or otherwise.
17

Moreover, it is

inconceivable that this court, or any other appellate court, would
find a genuine issue of material fact simply because appellant
lacked the time or resources to proffer evidence at the trial court
level.
Next, Burningham asserts that there is "absolute proof" that
he was confused at his deposition.

Any confusion Burningham may

have experienced at his deposition, no matter how absolute the
proof, hardly creates a genuine or triable issue of fact that
Burningham was incompetent when he signed the guaranty agreement.
There is no connection between his ability at his deposition to
recollect details concerning past events and his competency at the
signing of the guaranty agreement.
Moreover, what this "absolute proof" consists of is a mystery.
Burningham merely cites to page 157 of the record for support that
he believed that the guaranty agreement and the promissory note
were the same.
closed.

The significance of this allegation is not dis-

Ironically, page 157 of the record is part of Surety

Life's memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment.
This page consists of an excerpt from Burningham's deposition
Surety Life quotes to show that at the time Burningham executed the
guaranty agreement he clearly understood the nature and effect of
the contract.

This excerpt reads as follows:

Q.
There's a guaranty agreement which is
Exhibit 3, this is at the top of your file.
Do you know what the legal significance of
this is or what this guaranty agreement does
as far as you personally, Mr. Burningham?
A.
Well, I think it — I signed the notice
saying that I guaranty that I' 11 make payments
on the amount of money that I borrowed.
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Q.
Do you know what the difference is between this and the promissory note?
A.

No, I think they're one in the same.

Q.
And did you know at the time you signed
it what the difference was or was it one in
the same to you?
A.
To me, it's one in the same. I mean, I
agreed that we received that money and the
guaranty agreement is we'll pay it back.
That's my understanding of it.
(R. 157) (emphasis added).
Rather than illustrate incompetency on the part of Burningham,
this

excerpt

makes

absolutely

clear

the

fact

that

Burningham

understood that the guaranty agreement personally obligated him to
repay the monies owing.
Finally, Burningham cites to corrections in his deposition to
suggest that he had a poor memory.

Again, his ability at the

deposition to recall details has no bearing on his capacity to
enter

into

the

guaranty

agreement.

The

corrections

in

his

deposition merely clarify parts of Burningham ! s testimony regarding
events, times and conversations that have nothing to do with his
capacity to enter into the guaranty agreement.

(R. 180. )

Burningham fails to show that a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether he was competent to enter into the guaranty
agreement with Surety Life.
simple and unambiguous.

The guaranty agreement

is plain,

It obligated the parties to uncondi-

tionally pay the loan amount and gave their assent to an entry of
judgment against them to insure enforcement of its terms. There is
no showing by Burningham that the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to the trier of fact.
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B.

The fair market value of the subject
property at the time of the trustee's sale is not a genuine issue of
material fact.

Burningham contends that the main issue to be tried is that of
the market value of the Draper property at the time of the
trustee's sale.

This argument reflects a misunderstanding of the

nature of this case.

This case is not a mere deficiency action,

but is an action on Burningham's unconditional guaranty to repay a
promissory note.
Section 57-1-32 of the Utah Code provides the remedy for
securing a deficiency judgment following a sale of real property
under a trust deed.

This provision states in pertinent part:

At any time within three months after any sale
of property under a trust deed, as hereinabove
provided, an action may be commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for
which the trust deed was given as security,
and in such action the complaint shall set
forth the entire amount of the indebtedness
which was secured by such trust deed, the
amount for which such property was sold, and
the fair market thereof at the date of sale.
Before rendering judgment, the court shall
find the fair market value at the date of sale
of the property sold.
The court may not
render judgment for more than the amount by
which the amount of the indebtedness with
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the
fair market value of the property as of the
date of the sale. In any action brought under
this section, the prevailing parties shall be
entitled to collect its costs and reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in bringing an action
under this section.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1990) (emphasis added).
Surety Life, in instituting this action, was not merely
proceeding to collect the balance due "upon the obligation for
which the trust deed was given as security."
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In addition, Surety

Life also proceeded on the guaranty agreement signed by Burningham
and the defendants in their individual capacities.
Although a guaranty agreement, by its terms, necessarily
collateral to a primary or principal obligation (the note in this
case), it does create a separate and independent obligation.

The

Utah Supreme Court in Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646
P.2d 741 (Utah 1982), stated:
Thus, a guaranty of payment is absolute and a
guaranteed party need not fix its losses by
pursuing its remedies against the debtor or
the security before proceeding directly
against the guarantor.
Id. at 743 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Thus, the Utah

Supreme Court has recognized the separate contractual nature of a
guaranty agreement.
The very terms of the guaranty agreement in this case make
clear that the guaranties created obligations independent from
Burningham's and the defendants' obligations under the note and
other loan documents. Recitals contained in the guaranty agreement
state that Surety Life was unwilling to make the loan to Burningham
and the defendants ("guarantors") unless the guarantors guaranteed
payment of their obligations and performance of their covenants.
The recitals further state that the guarantors desire to give a
guaranty to Surety Life in order to induce Surety Life to make the
loan to the guarantors.

(See Addendum No. 3.)

Significantly, paragraph no. 1 of the guaranty agreement
states that the guarantors
[unconditionally an absolutely guarantee the
due and punctual payment of the principal of
the note, the interest thereon (including
adjustments and increases therein) and any
other sums due or which may become due thereon
21

and the due and punctual performance and
observance by the Borrower of all of the other
terms, provisions, covenants and conditions of
the Note, Deed of Trust and other Loan Documents •
(See Addendum No. 3.)
By its very terms, § 57-1-32 is limited to pursuing deficiency
actions

against

trustors

following

covered under the trust deeds.

trustee

sales

of

property

Accordingly, because this is not

just an action against the trustor for a deficiency following the
trustee's sale of the property,

the fair market

value of the

property sold at the trustee's sale is not an issue in this case.
As stated above, this was also an action against the guarantors on
a written

contract.

The clear

and

unambiguous

terms

of

the

guaranty agreement at issue in this case bind Burningham and the
defendants to pay their obligations whether or not Surety Life
chose to pursue a deficiency action against the borrowers and
whether before rendering judgment, the court determined the fair
market value of the property sold.
Significantly, Burningham and the defendants knowingly waived
any defenses provided by § 57-1-32 when they executed the guaranty
agreement.
(1983)

See Valley Bank v. Larsen, 104 Idaho 772, 663 P.2d 653

(a guarantor

may

legally

contract

to

waive

a

defense

provided by a deficiency judgment statute); see also Riverside
Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 441 (Okl. 1980) (guarantor
had waived certeiin statutory defenses).

The guaranty agreement

provides that Surety may sell the property held as security, and
that

the

defense

guarantors,
to

cy. . . ."

recovery

including
against

Burningham,

the

of

waive

any

any

deficien-

(See 1f 6, Addendum No. 3) (emphasis added).

Paragraph

22

guarantors

"hereby

15 of the guaranty agreement provides that the guarantors "consent
to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Utah and agree
that the beneficiary under the note shall be entitled to a judgment
and decree and enforcement by the Courts of the State of Utah . .
. ."

(See 1f 15, id,)

entered.

Burningham has no defense to the judgment

By agreement, Burningham has waived all defenses and

agreed to the entry of judgment.
C.

Without

Even if the fair market value of the
subject property was a triable issue
of fact, principles of collateral
estoppel bar the relitigation of
this issue.
question,

the

fair

market

value

of

the

subject

property in this action is not a triable issue of material fact.
Even assuming that it was, Burningham still loses.

Following two

days of hearings, and after reviewing competent and independent
appraisal reports and testimony, the Bankruptcy Court determined
that the fair market value of the subject property was $700,000.
On principles of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, the issue
of the fair market value of the subject property at the time of
sale is barred in this action.

See Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme,

Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983) (collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion, prevents the relitigation of issues that have been once
litigated and determined in another action even though the claims
for relief in the two actions may be different).
The elements required if the determination of an issue in a
preceding case is to bind the parties in a later case are wellestablished in Utah:
(i) the issues must be identical, (ii) the
judgment must be final, (iii) the party es23

topped must be a party or in privity with a
party to the preceding adjudication, and (iv)
the issue must have been competently, fully,
and fairly litigated.
Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1374 (1988); Baxter v. Department of
Transp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 1985).
Each of these elements is satisfied in this case.
regarding

the

The issue

fair market value of the subject property

is

obviously identical in both actions. The judgment in the Bankruptcy Court was final.

(See Addendum, No. 8.)

As a co-debtor and

partner, Burningham was in privity with Draper R.V. & Commercial
Storage, the party in the preceding bankruptcy action.

Finally,

the issue of the fair market value of the subject property at the
time of sale was competently, fully and fairly litigated. Hearings
lasted two days and the Bankruptcy Court scrupulously reviewed
competent independent appraisal reports and testimony.

Based on

its review, the Bankruptcy Court specifically made a finding of
fact that the value of the subject property was $700,000.

Under

the principles of collateral estoppel, even if the fair market
value of the Draper property was a triable issue of material fact,
the issue having already been litigated and determined in the
Bankruptcy Court is barred from further consideration by the trial
court.
CONCLUSION
Burningham has failed to state any grounds that the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment
entered against him and has failed to show triable issues of
material fact that preclude the trial courtf s granting of summary

24

judgment to Surety Life as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial
court's order should be affirmed in all respects and Surety Life
should be awarded its costs.
DATED this

lo'^

day of November, 1991.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

MICHAEL T. ROBERTS
Attorneys for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed in
the law firm of Campbell, Maack & Sessions, 170 South Main Street,
Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah and in said capacity and pursuant
to Rule 26, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, four (4) true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were hand
delivered on this

/y7>^~ day of November, 1991, to the following:
J. Douglas Kinateder
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 112
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM, HOWARD H.
HUCKS, MARKWEST CORPORATION,
a California corporation,
and JOHN DOES I-X,

Case No. C88-05729
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly

for hearing

pursuant to notice before the undersigned, one of the Judges of the
above-entitled Court on Friday, June 2, 1989 on various motions of
the Defendants. The Plaintiff was represented by Clark W. Sessions
and Clark L. Snelson of Sessions & Moore, its attorneys, and the
Defendants

were

represented

by

J.

Douglas

Kinateder,

their

attorney. The Court heard the arguments and statements of counsel,
reviewed the files and records including the memoranda and exhibits

thereto on file herein and being fully advised in the premises
hereby ORDERS as follows:
1.

That the Motion of the Defendant Howard H. Hucks to set

aside the Default Judgment heretofore made and entered against him
be and the same is hereby denied, and,
2.

That the motion of the Defendant Melvin K. Burningham to

vacate or set aside the summary judgment heretofore made and
entered against him be and the same is hereby denied, and,
3.

That the motion of the Defendants Markwest Corporation
i

and Howard W. Hucks to file an Answer and Counterclaim be and the*
same is hereby denied.
DATED this /J}^

day of June, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

(*/^-j~r-)

I^-JCX^

RAYMOND S. UNO
District Judge

1092-80J.PL3

**-- ^S^-^-t>—

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3

day of June, 1989, the

foregoing ORDER was served on Defendants by hand delivering a true
and correct copy thereof, to:
J. Douglas Kinateder, Esq.
2040 East 4800 South
Suite 112
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MTG m 51991
C^u^fl^

ooOoo
Surety Life Insurance Company,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

" » e * c « * * Court
Uan Coi4ftqft<f

ORDER RE BANKRUPTCY ISSUES
Case No. 890594-CA

Melvin K. Burningham,
Markwest Corporation, a
California corporation, and
John Does I-X,
Defendant and Appellant.

The court conducted a status and scheduling conference
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 28, presided over by the
undersigned, on August 1, 1991, at 11:00 a.m.

Appellant

appeared through his counsel, J. Douglas Kinateder.

The

trustee in appellant's bankruptcy case, Stephen W. Rupp, also
appeared.

Appellee appeared through its counsel, John C.

Martinson.

Based upon discussion with counsel, review of this

court's entire file, and review of bankruptcy documents
furnished at the conference,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Of the several defendants listed in the action

below, only Melvin K. Burningham appealed.

Upon the filing of

a bankruptcy petition by Burninqham, His rights and claims
pertaining to this matter became assets of his bankruptcy
estate.

By operation of law, his trustee has succeeded thereto

6.

The undersigned shall not participate in the

decision of this appeal on the merits.
BY THE COURT

Gregor^^^-trfme, Judge
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Tab 3

GUARANTY AGREEMENT
THIS GUARANTY AGREEMENT (hereinafter referred to as the
"Agreement'') is made and entered into this 9 t h
day of ©eeewbe^jJanuary
1987193-6-r by and between HOWARD H. HUCKS, WAYNE BURNINGHAM and MELVIN
K. BURNINGHAM (hereinafter collectively termed the "Guarantors") ,
to and for the benefit of SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah
corporation with principal offices located at 200 East South
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, its assigns and Participants
(hereinafter collectively termed the "Beneficiary").
WHEREAS, MARKWEST CORPORATION, a California corporation and
MELVIN K.
BURNINGHAM, individually (hereinafter collectively
termed the "Borrower") has applied to the Beneficiary for a loan
in the amount of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00), to be
evidenced by a Promissory Note (Secured by Deed of Trust with
Assignment of Rents and Leases) (hereinafter termed "the Note")
of even date herewith, secured by a certain Deed of Trust W^th
Assignment of Rents and Leases of even date herewith (hereinafter
termed the "Deed of Trust"), and further secured by other loan
documents executed between the Borrower and the Beneficiary
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Loan Documents") ;
and
WHEREAS, the Beneficiary is unwilling to make said loan
unless the Guarantors guarantee the payment of principal,
interest and other consideration specified herein and any other
charges provided for in the Note, Deed of Trust and the other
Loan Documents, and the performance by the Borrower of all the
covenants on its part to be performed and observed pursuant to
the provisions thereof;
WHEREAS, Guarantors desire to give such guarantee to
Beneficiary in order to induce Beneficiary to make and complete
said loan, and further, Guarantors share a direct or indirect
financial interest in the property described in the Deed of Trust
and/or the Borrower;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of these premises, for the
purpose of inducing Beneficiary to make the aforesaid loan to
Borrower, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt
and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the Guarantors
hereby:
1.
Unconditionally and absolutely guarantee the due and
punctual payment of the principal of the Note, the interest

thereon (including adjustments and increases therein) and any
other sums due or which may become due thereon, and the due and
punctual performance and observance by the Borrower of all of the
other terms, provisions, covenants and conditions of the Note,
Deed of Trust and the other Loan Documents, whether according to
the present terms thereof, at an earlier or accelerated date or
dates as provided therein, or pursuant to any extension of time
or to any change or changes in the terms, covenants, and
conditions thereof now or at any time hereafter made, granted or
extended.
2.
Understand and agree to pay the costs and expenses
incurred by or in behalf of the Beneficiary (including, without
limitation, reasonable attorney's fees and expenses) in enforcing
the obligations of the Guarantors under this Agreement and the
obligations of the Borrower with respect to the indebtedness
evidenced by the Note, the Deed of Trust and the other Loan
Documents. For purposes of this document, attorney's fees shall
include reasonable attorney's fees and costs actually incurred
incident and relating to any settlement or loan work c^ut
negotiations.
3. The obligations hereunder shall be joint and several, and
shall be absolute, unconditional and independent of the obligations of the Borrower in respect of the indebtedness of the
Borrower evidenced by the Note, the Deed of Trust and the other
Loan Documents, irrespective of any circumstances which might
constitute a legal or equitable discharge of a surety or
guarantor.
Such obligations shall not be discharged, affected,
modified, or impaired upon the happening from time to time of any
event, including, without limitation, any of the following,
whether or not with notice to, or the consent of, the Guarantors:
(a) the invalidity, irregularity, illegality, frustration or unenforceability of, or any defect in the Note,
the Deed of Trust or any of the other Loan Documents.,
(b) any present or future law or order of any government (de jure or de facto) or of any agency thereof
Purporting to reduce, amend or otherwise affect the indebtedness of the Sorrower evidenced by the Note, or to vary any
term$ of payment thereof;
(c) the waiver, compromise,, settlement, release,
extension, amendment, change, modiiication or termination.of
the terms of, or any or all of the obligations, covenants or
agreements of (i) the Borrower under the Note, the Deed of
Trust and any of the other Loan Documents (except by payment

-2-

in full of the indebtedness evidenced thereby) or (ii) the
Guarantors under this Agreement (except by payment in full of
all obligations hereunder);
(d) the failure to give notice to the Guarantors or any
of them of the occurrence of a default or event of default
under the Note, the Deed of Trust or any of the other Loan
Documents;
(e) the release, transfer, sale, exchange, assignment,
sublease, pledge, hypothecation or mortgaging, surrender or
other change in any collateral security now or hereafter
given by the Borrower for payment of the Note or the
performance of the Borrower's obligations under the Deed of
Trust or any of the other Loan Documents;
(f) the extension -of the time for payment of the
indebtedness evidenced by the Note or any part thereof owing
or payable by the Borrower or under this Agreement or of the
time for performance of any other obligations, covenants ^or
agreements under or arising out of the Note, the Deed of
Trust, or any of the other Loan Documents, or this Agreement
or the extension or the renewal of any thereof:
(g) the modification or amendment (whether material or
otherwise) of any obligation covenant or agreement set forth
in this Agreement:
(h) the taking of, or the omission to take, any of the
actions referred to in the Note, the Deed of Trust or any of
the other Loan Documents or this Agreement:
(i) any failure, omission or delay on the part of the
Beneficiary, or any other person, to enforce, assert or
exercise any right, power or remedy conferred in this Agreement, the Note, the Deed of Trust or any of the other Loan
Documents;
(j)
the
voluntary
or
involuntary
liquidation,
dissolution, sale or other disposition of all or substantially all the assets, marshalling of assets and liabilities,
receivership, insolvency, bankruptcy, assignment for the
benefit
of
creditors,
reorganization,
arrangement
or
composition with creditors or readjustment of, or other
similar proceedings affecting any Guarantor or the Borrower
or any of the assets of any of them, or any allegation or
contest of the validity of the Note, Deed of Trust, this
Agreement or any of the other Loan Documents, or the
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disaffirmance or attempted disaffirmance of the Note, Deed of
Trust, this Agreement or any of the other Loan Documents, in
any such proceedings;
(k) any event or action that would, in the absence of
this paragraph, result in the release or discharge of any
Guarantor from the performance or observance of any obligation, covenant or agreement contained in this or any other
guaranty; and
(1) the default or failure of any Guarantor fully to
Perform any of its obligations set forth in this Agreement or
any other guaranty,
4. Acknowledge and agree that a separate action or actions
may be brought and prosecuted against the Guarantors whether such
action is brought against the Borrower or whether the Borrower be
joined in any such action or actions; and the Guarantors waive
the benefit of any statute of limitations affecting their
liability hereunder or the enforcement thereof to the extent
permitted by law.
Any part payment by the Borrower or ottfer
circumstances which operate to toll any statute of limitations as
to the Borrower shall operate to toll the statute of limitations
as to Guarantors. Every claim or demand which Guarantors, or any
of them, may have against the Borrower shall be fully subordinate
to the indebtedness evidenced by the Note, the Deed of Trust and
the other Loan Documents.
5. Acknowledge and agree to waive any right to require the
Beneficiary (a) to proceed against the Borrower; (b) to proceed
against or exhaust any security for the indebtedness evidenced by
the Note, the Deed of Trust and the other Loan Documents now or
hereafter held; or (c) to pursue any other remedy in their power
whatsoever. The Beneficiary may, at its election, exercise any
right or remedy it may have against the Borrower or any security
now or hereafter held, including without limitation, the right to
foreclose upon any security by judicial or nonjudicial sale,
without affecting or impairing in any way the liability of
Guarantors hereunder except to the extent the indebtedness
evidence by the Note, the Deed of Trust and the other Loan
Documents has been paid, and the Guarantors waive any defense
arising out of the absence, impairment or loss of any right of
reimbursement or subrogation or other right or remedy of
Guarantors against the Borrower or any such security, whether
resulting from such election, or otherwise. The Guarantors waive
any defense arising by reason of any disability or other defense
of the Borrower or by reason of the cessation from any cause
whatsoever of the liability of the Borrower.
Until the
4

indebtedness evidenced by the Note, the Deed of Trust and the
other Loan Documents is paid in full, the Guarantors shall have
no right of subrogation, and waive any right to enforce any
remedy which the Beneficiary now has or may hereafter have
against the Borrower, and waive any benefit of, and any right to
participate in any security now or hereafter held by the
Beneficiary. The Guarantors waive all presentments, demands for
performance, notices of nonperformance, protests, notices of
protest, notices of dishonor, and notices of acceptance and
reliance on this Agreement.
6. Acknowledge and agree that the Beneficiary may pursue its
rights and remedies under this Agreement notwithstanding any
other guaranty of or security for the indebtedness evidenced by
the Note, the Deed of Trust and the other Loan Documents. The
Guarantors acknowledge that all or a portion of the indebtedness
evidenced by the Note, Deed of Trust and the other Loan Documents
is secured by the Deed of Trust. The Guarantors authorize the
Beneficiary, at its sole option, without notice or demand $nd
without affecting the liability of the Guarantors under t$is
Agreement, to foreclose the Deed of Trust and the interests in
real property secured thereby by judicial or nonjudicial sale,
and the Guarantors hereby waive any defense to the recovery
against Guarantors of any deficiency after a nonjudicial sale,
and the Guarantors expressly waive any defense or benefits that
may be derived from applicable law, and all suretyship defenses
it would otherwise have under applicable law.
The Guarantors
waive any right to receive notice of the sale of any property
subject to the Deed of Trust securing the indebtedness evidenced
by the Note, the Deed of Trust and the other Loan Documents, and
the Guarantors' failure to receive any such notice shall not
impair or affect Guarantors' liability hereunder.
7. Understand and agree that each of the waivers set forth
in this Agreement are made with full knowledge of their significance and consequences, and that under the circumstances, the
waivers are reasonable and are not contrary to public policy or
law. If any of said waivers are determined to be contrary to any
applicable law or public policy, such waivers shall be effective
only to the maximum extent permitted by law.
8. Understand and agree that this Agreement shall bind the
successors and assigns of the Guarantors, and shall inure to the
respective successors and assigns of the Beneficiary.
9.
Understand and agree that this Agreement shall be
governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the
State of Utah.
-5-

10.
Understand and agree that in case any right of the
Beneficiary herein shall be held to be invalid, illegal or
unenforceable, such invalidity, illegality or unenforceability
shall not affect any other right granted hereby.
11.
Understand and agree that all notices and other
communications under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall
be given by mailing such notice by Registered or Certified mail,
addressed as hereinafter provided.
Any notice Provided for
herein shall be deemed received three (3) days following the date
such written notice is deposited in the United States mails, or
the time of the actual receipt, if earlier. Notice(s) shall be
addressed to the parties hereto as follows:
IF TO THE BENEFICIARY, TO:
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
a Utah corporation
200 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attn: W. F. Dickson
IF TO THE GUARANTORS, TO:
HOWARD H. HUCKS
405 Alan Road
Santa Barbara, California 93109
MELVIN K. BURNINCHAM
2761 Filmore Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
WAYNE BURNINCHAM
11648 Player Circle
Sandy, Utah 84092
12.
Understand and agree that the terms of this Agreement
may not be amended, changed or modified in any way except by a
writing
executed by the parties hereto, their respective
successors or assigns,
13.
Understand and agree that this Agreement and the Note,
the Deed of Trust and the other Loan Documents executed by the
Borrower and/or the Guarantors and/or the Beneficiary contain the
entire agreement of the Guarantors and is not subject to any oral
conditions.
-6

14.
Acknowledge that each of them has been provided with a
full, true and complete copy of this Agreement, the Note, the
Deed of Trust, and the other Loan Documents.
15.
Consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State
of Utah and agree that the Beneficiary under the Note shall be
entitled to a judgment and decree and enforcement by the Courts
of the State of Utah for any amount which may be adjudged to be
owing to the Beneficiary, including, but not limited to,
reasonable attorney's fees, interest and costs.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Guarantors have executed
Agreement in the day and year first above written.

this

GUARANTORS:'

BY^fe^^

/HOWARD H/HUCKS

s •—"

MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM
BY

*/ Gis
--O'
WAYNE BURNINGHAM

i/
I

A

*

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF Tip T l
SALT LAKE
1987
January
9 th
On t h i s
d a y o f -Deeea*be-2?7—1-9-8-6-, p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d
b e f o r e me HOWARD H. HUCKS, o n e o f t h e s i g n e r s o f t h e
above
i n s t r u m e n t , who d u l y a c k n o w l e d g e d t o me t h a t h e e x e c u t e d t h e
same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Bountiful, UT,
R e s i d i n g at:_
My C o m m i s s i o n

Expires:

7/9/88

STATE OF

UTAH

)

) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

January, 1987
9th
On this
day of -©eoember-,—1-&-8-6-, personally appeared
before me MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM, one of the signers of the above
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

J2t.#< '.. *LS t"
NOTARY^PUBLIC
Residing at:

C^V

Bountiful, UT.

My Commission Expires:
7/9/88
STATE OF

UTAH

COUNTY OF SALTLAKE

)

) ss.
)

January > 1987
9th
day of -Beeembe^—-19*6/ personally appeared
On this
before me WAYNE BURNINGHAM, one of the signers of the above
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

JL
NOTARY

6-i^L ~>L «S

PUBLIC
Residing at:

My Commission E x p i r e s :
7/9/88

0 1 / 0 9 / 8 7-[GBagrBURN]
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d. <M*
Bountiful, UT.

I

CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
KEVIN E. ANDERSON (0099)
CYNTHIA K. CASSELL (5050)
SESSIONS & MOORE
Attorneys for Defendant
Surety Life Insurance Company
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 359-4100

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DRAPER RV & COMMERCIAL STORAGE
A Utah Partnership, MELVIN
KEITH BURNINGHAM, and WAYNE
BURNINGHAM,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT SURETY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY'S MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, ITS MOTION
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

vs.
Civil No. C88-564
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE CO., a
Utah Corporation, and UNITED
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
Utah Corporation,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.

Defendant Surety Life Insurance Company (hereinafter "Surety") , by and Ihrough Sessions & Moore, its attorneys of record,
submits the following Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint or in the Alternative, Its Motion
for a More Definite Statement:

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

During 1985, Surety made a commitment to Mark-West

Corporation to provide permanent financing for recreational
vehicle and commercial storage units to be located in Draper,
Utah.
2.

Thereafter, Mark-West obtained construction financing

from Defendant United Savings & Loan Association (hereinafter
"United Savings11) .
3.

On January 1, 1987, Surety loaned $1,000,000.00 to

Mark-West Corporation and Melvin K. Burningham (hereinafter
collectively "Mark-West").

The nature of Surety's loan was

permanent financing for Mark-West's project.

Surety was not

involved in any way in the construction lending process nor in
the construction of the project itself.
4.

The loan was secured by a Deed of Trust and Assignment

of Rents and was recorded on January 9, 1987.

Interest on the

loan was at twelve and one-half percent (12%Z) ami the note
called for installments of $10,673.00 monthly. Attached hereto as
Exhibits "A" and "B" respectively and incorporated herein by
reference are the Promissory Note and the Deed of Trust and
Assignment of Rents.
5.

Surety had no right to control, nor did it control, in

any way, any aspect of the construction process.
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6.

Surety had no right to control, not did it exercise any

control, over any acts of United Savings, Mark-West's construction lender,
7.

The only role played by Surety during the construction

process of the project was that of the financial lending institution which had made a commitment for a permanent loan.
8.

The loan went into default by reason of non-payment of

installments and demand was sent by certified mail on July 28,
1987, to the appropriate parties.
9.

The Notice of Default and Election to Sell was recorded

on September 15, 1987.

A copy of the Notice of Default and

Election to Sell is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference.
A Notice of the Trustee1s Sale was served by posting

10.

and by sending copies of the same by certified mail to the
appropriate parties and by publishing the same in the Salt Lake
A copy wt the Notice of Trustee's Sale is attached hereto

Times.

as Exhibit ffDff and incorporated herein by reference.
11.

The Trustee's Sale was to have taken place on February

1, 1988.
12.

Immediately prior to the scheduled Trustee's Sale, the

Plaintiffs herein filed their Verified Complaint and Motion for a

-3->"f

<-* try

-7/1

Temporary Restraining Order, and the Court issued its Temporary
Restraining Order on February 1, 1988 at 8:30 a.m.
13.

On June 22, 1988, this Court made a bench order dis-

solving the Temporary Restraining Order, denying Plaintiffs1
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and granting Surety ten days
following entry of the Order within which to answer or otherwise
plead to Plaintiffs1 Verified Complaint.

The Order was entered

June 24, 1988.
14.

Neither Plaintiff Draper RV & Commercial Storage, nor

Plaintiff Wayne Burningham were parties to the transaction giving
rise to this case, nor does either Plaintiff have privity of
contract with Mark-West.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO
UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6) FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
LEGALLY COGNIZABLE CLAIM.
Plaintiff Draper RV & Commercial Storage and Plaintiff Wayne
Burningham have no standing to bring a Complaint against Surety
nor is there any privity of contract between Mark-West and
Plaintiffs Draper RV & Commercial Storage and Wayne Burningham;
therefore, said Plaintiffs1 Complaint against Surety must be
dismissed.
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Plaintiff Melvin Keith Burningham was an individual signator
in the original loan transaction with Surety; however, his
Complaint against Surety must be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
In their verified complaint, Plaintiffs make the following
representations concerning Surety:
(1)

That during the spring and summer of 1985, Plain-

tiff Burningham secured a commitment for long-term financing
from Surety.
(2) That certain parts of the project for which the
long-term financing (permanent loan) was obtained had never
been completed by either Defendant Surety or United Savings
& Loan Association (although loan proceeds remained unused
in United Savings' possession and control).
(3) That at the time of the closing on the long-time
financing with Surety, Surety was aware of and knew of the
problems, changes, decreased value and rentability of the
storage units, but agreed to join with United Savings as
co-lender in the long-term loan, rather than as sole lender,
thereby giving its sanction to, and joining with United
Savings in United Savings' position on the project.
(4) That both Surety and United Savings stand in the
same position "on this matter" and have chosen to ignore the
problems and responsibilities on their parts.
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(5) That as a result of (among other things) failure
of Defendants to complete the project, many would-be tenants
have decided not to rent.
(6) That the actions of Defendants were based on fraud
and misrepresentation and conspiracy "regarding the original
construction loan commitment and commitment fee, time for
closing, and in taking over supervision of construction,
negotiating and paying therefore, and making changes in
construction plans and specifications, and in concealing
facts which were material to the transaction."
(7) That as a result of fraudulent conduct of Defendants Plaintiffs have been damaged.
(8) That both Defendants proceeded with the closing
knowing that the project was not finished and that the
workmanship and materials were inferior to that specified in
the original plans.
(9) That Surety accepted certain conduct of United
Savings, and that the conduct of United Savings constituted
a breach of fiduciary duty.
(10) That as a result of the transactions and actions
of Defendants, the project has not been finished, the value
of that part of the completed project is diminished, Plaintiffs have not received proper value for the liability they
incurred, and Plaintiffs1 original equity in the project and
the value of their services are in jeopardy of being lost.
-6-

However,

Plaintiffs have not alleged, nor can they, that

(1)

Surety was required to complete the project;

(2)

Surety had any responsibility for United Savings1

actions;
(3)

Surety controlled disbursements;

(4)

Surety approved or had any right to approve con-

struction;
(5)

Surety approved or had any right to approve con-

struction changes;
(6)

Surety had any relationship with United Savings.

Plaintiffs' conclusory statement that Surety conspired with
United Savings is unsupported by any factual representation or
inference.

Moreover, Surety had no right to control, nor any

right to remedy, United Savings1 actions.

Plaintiffs state that

Surety chose to ignore defects in the project and to provide
co-lending with United Savings despite Surety1s knowledge of
United Savings' actions.

In fact, Surety had no legal

alternative but to provide the permanent financing after it had
committed itself to provide such financing.
None of the facts alleged by Plaintiffs, even if true, give
rise to a cause of action against Surety.

The only actions

Plaintiffs allege Surety directly undertook were (1) Surety's
knowledge of United Savings' conduct with acceptance of the same,
and (2) Surety's not completing the project.

However, Surety's

knowledge of United Savings' actions and acceptance of them do
-7T T C 7 /TT
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not give rise to a claim absent some duty to control or right of
control on SuretyTs part which Surety did not have. Furthermore,
Surety had no right or authority to complete the construction of
the project.

Surety did not provide co-lending with United

Savings but provided permanent financing in the amount to which
it committed, while United

Savings provided

construction

financing and permanent financing for that amount over and above
the amount to which Surety had committed.
Dismissal of a complaint is proper when, in viewing the
allegations in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs
could not in any event establish a right to recover.

Barrus v.

Wilkinson, 398 P.2d 207, 208 (Utah 1965) (citing King Bros. Inc.
v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 374 P.2d 254 (Utah 1962)).

Accord Vigue v.

Evans Products Co., 608 P.2d 488, 490 (Mont. 1980); Higgins v.
State, 422 P.2d 836 (Wash. 1967).

Furthermore, a complaint may

be dismissed by motion if it is clearly without merit and the
lack of merit consists of an absence of law supporting the sort
of claim made.

Wells v. Stanley J. Thill & Assoc, 452 P.2d

1015, 1016 (Mont. 1969).
Plaintiffs have failed to allege a legally cognizable claim
against Surety and therefore, their complaint should be dismissed.
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POINT II
PLAINTIFFS1 COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
FAILURE TO PLEAD FRAUD WITH PARTICULARITY
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) states:

tf

In all averments

of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake shall be stated with particularity."
The elements of fraud were set forth by the Utah Supreme
Court in Pace v. Parish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952):
(1) that a representation was made; (2)
concerning a presently existing material
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the
representor either (a) knew to be false, or
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representation; (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6)
that the other party, acting reasonably and
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact
rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to
act; (9) to his injury and damage.
Id. at 274-275.
Merely alleging each of these elements is insufficient.
,f

The basic facts must be set forth with sufficient particularity

to show what facts are claimed to constitute such charges.11
Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 1962).

n

The purpose

of [the Rule 9(b)] requirement dictates that it reach all circumstances where the pleader alleges the kind of misrepresentations,
omissions, or other deceptions covered the by the term 'fraud1 in
its broadest dimension.11

Williams v. State Farm Insurance

Company, 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982).
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In light of this criteria, Plaintiffs' fraud claims are
severely deficient.

As outlined in Point I, Plaintiffs alleged

certain conduct on Surety's part.

None of that conduct, however,

even if true, supports a claim of fraud or fraudulent conduct.
Plaintiffs have not only failed to allege that Surety made a
fraudulent misrepresentation as defined by the Court in Pace v.
Parrish, Plaintiffs failed to allege that Surety made any
representation whatsoever,

nor did Plaintiffs allege that Surety

fraudulently omitted to state a material fact.

In fact, the

essence for Plaintiffs' fraud claim is contained in paragraph 19
of Plaintiffs' Complaint:
The transaction and actions of the defendants
as described above were based on fraud and
misrepresentation and conspiracy, regarding
the original construction loan commitment and
commitment fee, time for closing, and in
taking over supervision of construction,
negotiating and paying therefor, in making
changes in construction plans and specifications , and in concealing facts which were
material to the transaction.
Surety, however, was not the construction lender, and had no
involvement with the construction loan or the construction
process.

Plaintiffs attempt to tie Surety in with United Savings

by indicating Surety accepted United Savings' conduct, but Surety
had no control whatsoever over the conduct of United Savings.
Plaintiffs' blanket allegations of fraud against Surety are
insufficient to comply with Rule 9(b). Moreover, Plaintiffs
failed to ascribe any particular fraudulent conduct to either

T.7C7 /TJ_"7 M
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Defendant.

The latter, in itself, renders Plaintiffs1 Complaint

insufficiently plead under Rule 9(b). See, e.g.,

Adair v. Hund

International Resources, Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 744-45 (N.D.
111. 1981); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cable/Tel.
Corp., 90 F.R.D. 662, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' entire Complaint is plead in generalities.
Surety is unable to adequately answer because of the vague and
ambiguous nature of the pleading.

Therefore, even if this Court

does not dismiss Plaintiffs1 Complaint in its entirety, this
Court must grant Surety's Alternative Motion for a More Definite
Statement under Rule 12(e) and require the Plaintiffs to plead
with particularity their claims as shown herein to be deficient.
DATED this S~

day of July, 1988.
SESSIONS & MOORE

CYNTHIA K. CASSELL
Attorneys for Defendant
Surety Life Insurance
Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the S?*

day of July, 1988, I

caused to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM to:
Glen W. Park, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
247 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Gregory S. Bell, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorney for Defendant United Savings
& Loan Association
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Draper RV and Commercial Storage
Melvin Keith Burningham
Wayne Burningham
2761 Filmore Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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Tab 5

CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
KEVIN E. ANDERSON (0099)
CYNTHIA K. CASSELL (3981)
SESSIONS & MOORE
Attorneys for Defendant
Surety Life Insurance Company
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 359-4100

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DRAPER RV & COMMERCIAL STORAGE
a Utah partnership, MELVIN
KEITH BURNIGHAM, and WAYNE
BURNINGHAM,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. C88-564

SURETY LIFE INSURANCE CO., a
Utah corporation, and UNITED
SAVINGS &. LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
Utah corporation,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.
The Motion of the Defendant Surety Life Insurance Company to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint came on regularly for hearing
pursuant to notice before the undersigned, one of the Judges of
the above-entitled Court, on Friday, August 26, 1988, at 8:00
a.m.

Plaintiff, Wayne Burningham, appeared pro se and the

remaining Defendants did not appear either in person or through
counsel.

The Defendant Surety Life Insurance Company was

represented by Clark W. Sessions of Sessions and Moore, said
Defendant's attorneys.

The Court heard the arguments and state-

ments of Mr. Burningham and counsel including an explanation as
to the Plaintiff's failure to secure counsel as earlier ordered
by the above-entitled Court and being fully advised in the
premises it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1.

That the Motion of the Defendant Surety Life Insurance

Company to Dismiss the above-entitled action as to the Defendant
Surety Life Insurance Company be and the same is hereby granted,
and,
2.

That the above-entitled action as to the Defendant

Surety Life Insurance Company be and the same is hereby
dismissed.
DATED this

^k

day of August 1988.
BY THE COURT:

JSl Pftr'g. "&«,,.

PAT B. BRIAN r
District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

35

day of August, 1988, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed, first
class mail, postage prepaid to:

-2QL.La-fi/iL

Draper RV and Commercial Storage
Melvin Keith Bumingham
Wayne Bumingham
2761 Filmore Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Gregory S. Bell, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendant United Savings
& Loan Association
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
KEVIN E. ANDERSON (0099)
SESSIONS & MOORE
Attorneys for Defendant
Surety Life Insurance Company
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 359-4100

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DRAPER RV & COMMERCIAL STORAGE
A Utah Partnership, MELVIN
KEITH BURNINGHA11, and WAYNE
BURNINGHAM,

•

ORDER

1

Civil No. C88-564

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE CO., a
Utah Corporation, and UNITED
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
Utah Corporation,
Defendants.

:

Judge Pat B. Brian

;
;

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
pursuant to notice on the Motion of the Plaintiffs for a
Preliminary Injunction and related matters.

The Plaintiffs were

represented by Glen W. Park, Esq., their attorney.

The Defendant

Surety Life Insurance Company, a Utah corporation was represented
by Clark W. Sessions, Esq. of Sessions & Moore, its attorneys,
and the Defendant United Savings and Loan Association, a Utah
corporation was represented by David M. Wahlquist, Esq., of

Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, said Defendant's attorneys.

The

court heard the evidence adduced and proffered, reviewed the
exhibits offered and received, the files and records herein and
the arguments and statements of counsel and after considering the
various requirements of Rule 65A and the law in such cases made
and provided and having determined that the Plaintiff's have an
adequate remedy at law and failed to meet the conditions
precedent to the granting of a preliminary injunction,
NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion of the Defendant Surety Life
Insurance Company, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1.

That the temporary restraining order heretofore issued

by the above-entitled Court in the above-captioned matter be and
the same is hereby dissolved, and,
2.

That the motion of the Plaintiffs for a Preliminary

Injunction be and the same is hereby denied, and,
3.

That the Defendants shall be granted a period of ten

days following the entry hereof within which to answer or
otherwise plead to Plaintiff's Verified Complaint,
DATED this

day of June, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

PAT B. BRIAN
DISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the cP3

day of June, 1988, the

foregoing ORDER was served on the following parties by mailing a
true and correct copy thereof, postage prepaid, to:
Glen W. Park, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
247 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Gregory S. Bell, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorney for Defendant United Savings
& Loan Association
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Tab 6
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Petition for Voluntary Bankruptcy
JuL

Chapter 11

-

i.r

f

United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah
_ Division
D

COPARTNERSHIP

CORPORATION

DO NOT COMPLETE ABOVE
- FOR COURT USE ONLY •

In re

DRAPER R.V. & COMMERCIAL STORAGE

38H-Q42AS

A Utah Partnership
Debtor [include ail names used by debtor within last 6 years]
Employer's Tax ID No. of debtor:

#87-0444595

VOLUNTARY PETITION — CHAPTER 11

1.
#.

Petitioner's mailing address, including county, is . P. :.Q:. .?p.X. .246 1.. Sandy A # Utah. 8 4 0 9 1

Sa It # .Lake. .Co u n t y

;

2. Petitioner has resided [or has had its domicile or principal place of business or has had its principal
assets] within this district for the longer portion of the preceding 180 days than in any other district.
3. Petitioner is qualified to file this petition and is entitled to the benefits of title 11, United States Code as
a voluntary debtor.
4.

Petitioner intends to file a plan under Chapter 11, Bankruptcy Code.

5. Exhibt "A" is attached to and made part of this petition.

7
Signed

'uj

l A t t o ^ y for Petitioner)

Attorney.In Fact
Appearing

Acuta:...1.396..E.,..51I.Y.ejccr.e.s.t..Dr.,
Sandy.,...Utah...8.4Q9.3

Unsworn Declaration under Penalty of Perjury on Behalf of a Corporation or Partnership
I, .. .Wa y n e . . J . . . . B u X J l i ng.h.aJD
[the president or other officer or an authorized
agent of the corporation! [or a member or an authorized agent of the partnership! named as petitioner in the foregoing petition, declare under penalty
of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, and that the filing of this petition on behalf of the [corporation! [or partnership! has been authorized.
Executed on

7.7.? 2 - J. 9 8 8

Signature

PrO-$£

TT?I VXTKXR l/MUCl Of TO W T O i n T XKIOM IMS AID ATOUIS WXTlUTj ° ^
Y7ID LXHM CXHTtUd XI I B KXB0L1 Of UCI HACl. ttUTT ALL ASDKISStt.
«*+ I • •
117*
DRAPER RV & COMMERCIAL
STORAGE
P.O.BOX 2461 Sandy Ut
84091
M

M

—

—

*

*

—

*

—

—

M i l

WAYNE BURNINGHAM
1396 E. Silvercrest Dr.
Sandy, Ut. 84093
Attorney In Fact, ProSe
mm^mmmm^mmmmi tomm——mm6

P.S» TSUSTBS CfTICE
K N O T IBEML BUILDING
225 SCOT STMZ HDM 4218
ALT LME Cm, UDH 84138

S u r e t y Life Insurance
A l l s t a t e I n s . Plaza E-2
N o r t h b r o o k , 111. 60062

u n i t e d Savings & Loan
376 E. 4 t h So.
SLC, U t . 84111

Howard Hucks
3463 State St. #313
Santa Barbara Ca. 93105

Phyllis Stokes
2588-D El Camino Real
0270 Carlesbad, Ca.
32008

Verification on Behalf of a Corporation
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah
Division
In re
i

Case No

Debtor
\
[include here all names used by debtor within last 6 years) '
Tax Identification No.
I,
, the president [or other officer or an authorized agent] of the corporation
named as petitioner in the foregoing petition, certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct, and that the filing of this petition on behalf of the corporation has been authorized.
Executed on

Verification on Behalf of a Partnership
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah
Division
In re
DRAPER R . V .
A Utah

& COMMERCIAL

Partnership

STORAGE
,

Bankruptcy No.

Debtor
J
[include here all names used by debtor within last 6 yean) I
Tax Identification No.

87-0444595

I, Wayne Burningham a member [or an authorized agent] of the partnership named as petitioner in the foregoing petition, certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct,
and that the filing of this petition on behalf of the partnership has been authorized.
Executed on

/ ~ 21- ?~f*
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DRAPER R.V. & C O M M E K C I A L S T O R A G E
Wayne B u r n i n g h a m - A t t o r n e y In Fact
Appearing Pro-Se
1396 E. S i l v e r c r e s t D r .
Sandy, Utah 8 4 0 9 3
(801) 5 7 1 - 3 0 2 5

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
D I S T R I C T OF UTAH, CENTRAL

COURT
DIVISION

In Re;
DRAPER

R.V. & C O M M E R C I A L

STORAGE;

M O T I O N FOR H E A R I N G ON ORDER
TO SHOW C A U S E
C
Case No. 8 8 - 4 2 4 5
Judge GLEN E. CLARK

Petitioner
Vs.
SURETY LIFE

INSURANCE

COMES NOW the p e t i t i o n e r who m o v e s the Court for an Order To
Show Cause in the a b o v e - e n t i t l e d
This Motion

is based upon the fact that the P e t i t i o n e r

a Petition

For V o l u n t a r y

Bankruptcy

Court, District

11:50 AM,

action.

Bankruptcy

Chapter

Of Utah, Central

11 in the United

Life

both by ohone and hand d e l i v e r y of a copy

of the p e t i t i o n . M r . S e s s i o n s of S e s s i o n s And M o o r e c o n t i n u e d
and c o n d u c t e d

with

a T r u s t e e Sale of the P r o p e r t y on July 2 7 , 1988 at

10:00 AM in v i o l a t i o n

of an A u t o m a t i c

r e q u e s t s a h e a r i n g be set
Surety

States

D i v i s i o n on July 26,

1 9 8 8 , M r . Clark S e s s i o n s , a t t o r n e y for Surety

I n s u r a n c e was n o t i f i e d

filed

Life from e x e c u t i n g

ession of the p r o p e r t y
DATED this

2£?L

Stay. P e t i t i o n e r

in this m a t t e r and an Order

therefore
Staying

on its Order To Vacate and taking

be issued pending the
day of July,

1988.

i/>yL^_

J^

hearing.

pos-
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
CYNTHIA K. CASSELL (5050)
SESSIONS & MOORE
Attorneys for Surety Life
Insurance Co.
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)359-4100

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

In Re:
DRAPER R.V. & COMMERCIAL
STORAGE, a Utah
partnership,
Debtor.

Case No. 88C-04245
(Chapter 11)
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Motion of Surety Life Insurance Company for relief from
the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 came on regularly for hearing pursuant to notice before the Honorable Glen E.
Clark, United States Bankruptcy Judge, on Thursday, December 8,
1988, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. and continued thereafter on
Monday, December 12, 1988 at 9:00

a.m.

The Debtor was

represented by J. Douglas Kinateder, Debtor's attorney, and
Surety Life Insurance Company was represented by Clark W.

Sessions and Cynthia K. Cassell of Sessions & Moore, its
attorneys.
The Court having heard and considered the testimony of the
witnesses and the evidence offered and received, and having heard
and considered the arguments and statements of counsel, and being
fully advised in the premises, makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The property located at 12700 South State Street,

Draper, Utah, and more particularly described as follows:
Lot 10, BURNINGHAM INDUSTRIAL SUBDIVISION
PHASE 2, according to the official plat
thereof, recorded in Book 85-11 of the Plats
at Page 192, records of Salt Lake County,
Utah.
Less and excepting therefrom the Easterly 30
feet of the Southerly 415.84 feet thereof.
Together with a Right of Way over the following tract of land.
Beginning at a point South 89°48,40ff East
along the section line 837.23 feet and North
95.37 feet from the Southwest corner of
Section 30, Township 3 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence West 240.23 feet; thence North 33.73
feet; thence West 364.67 feet to the East
line of a frontage road at a point North
126.34 feet and East 232.33 feet from the
aforesaid Southwest section corner, thence
South 5°26f West 60.27 feet; thence East
370.38 feet to a P.C. of a curve to the
right, thence along the arc of said curve
25.09 feet to a P.R.C. center bearing South
8°32f West; thence along a curve to the left
25.09 feet to the P.T.; thence East 190.23
feet; thence North 30.0 feet to the point of
beginning.

-2TJA^
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Together with a Right of Way over the following:
Beginning at a point which is South 89°48!40"
East 837.23 feet and North 65.37 feet from
the Southwest corner of Section 30, Township
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; and running thence South 18.87
feet; thence North 86°47f18M West 21.17 feet;
thence North 75°00!45" West 25.77 feet;
thence North 83°15t22,f West 58.09 feet;
thence North 84°10'28M West 29.87 feet;
thence North 88038'58,! West 26.56 feet;
thence North 82°27f50,f West 4.14 feet; thence
East 164.09 feet to the point of beginning.
is not property of the estate.
2.

As of the date Debtor filed its petition in bankruptcy

(July 26, 1988) and as of the date Surety proceeded with
Trusteee's Sale (July 27, 1988), Debtor did not have a legal
interest in the Property, but did have a possessory interest in
the Property and Surety was thus required to move for relief from
the stay.
3.

The Debtor was in possession of the Property as of the

date of the hearing on Surety's motion for relief from stay.
4.

The value of the Property is $700,000.00.

5.

The obligation owed to Surety Life Insurance Company

which is secured by a Deed of Trust on the Property totals
approximately $1,000,000.00.
6.

The owners of the Property have no equity in the

Property.
7.

The Debtor has not met its burden of proof with regard

to its ability to effect a reorganization.

TJC O . C
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8.

The Court makes no finding as to bad faith on the part

of the Debtor.
From the foregoing findings of Fact, the Court makes the
following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Since the Property is not property of the estate,

Surety is entitled to relief from the Stay.
2.

That the Court should make and enter its Order

accordingly.
DATED this

day of

, 198

.

BY THE COURT:

GLEN E. CLARK
United States Bankruptcy
Court Judge

-4W63:S-12/12

ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the //*(

day of

>^^/-s , 1989,

I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be hand-delivered to:
J. Douglas Kinateder, Esq.
Attorney for Debtor
20A0 East 4800 South
Suite 112
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of

,

1989, true and correct copies of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW were mailed by first-class mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Clark W. Sessions, Esq.
Cynthia K. Cassell, Esq.
SESSIONS & MOORE
Attorneys for Surety Life
Insurance Co.
505 East 200 South, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
J. Douglas Kinateder, Esq.
Attorney for Debtor
2040 East 4800 South
Suite 112
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
CYNTHIA K. CASSELL (5050)
SESSIONS & MOORE
Attorneys for Surety Life
Insurance Co.
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 359-4100
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
IN RE:
DRAPER R.V. & COMMERCIAL
STORAGE, a Utah
partnership,
Debtor.

;
:
:
j
!i

Case No. 88C-04245
(Chapter 11)
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF
FROM STAY

:

The Motion of Surety Life Insurance Company for relief from
the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 came on regularly for hearing pursuant to notice before the Honorable Glen E.
Clark, United States Bankruptcy Judge, on Thursday, December 8,
1988, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. and continued thereafter on
Monday, December 12, 1988, at 9:00 a.m.

The Debtor was repre-

sented by J. Douglas Kinateder, Debtorfs attorney, and Surety
Life Insurance Company was represented by Clark W. Sessions and
Cynthia K. Cassell of Sessions & Moore, its attorneys.
The Court heard and considered the sworn testimony of
witnesses called, considered evidence offered and received, heard

and considered the arguments and statements of counsel and after
having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and being fully advised in the premises, hereby ORDERS AS
FOLLOWS:
1.

That the Motion of Surety Life Insurance Company for

relief from the Automatic Stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 be
and the same is hereby granted, and,
2.

That the Automatic Stay heretofore in effect with

respect to the Debtor and its possessory interest in and to
certain real property and improvements thereon located at 12700
South State Street, Draper, Utah and more particularly described
as follows:
Lot 10, BURNINGHAM INDUSTRIAL SUBDIVISION
PHASE 2, according to the official plat
thereof, recorded in Book 85-11 of the Plats
at Page 192, records of Salt Lake Countv,
Utah.
Less and excepting therefrom the Easterly 30
feet of the Southerly 415.84 feet thereof.
Together with a Right of Way over the following tract of land.
Beginning at a point South 89°48t40ff East
along the section line 837.23 feet and North
95.37 feet from the Southwest corner of
Section 30, Township 3 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence West 240.23 feet; thence North 33.73
feet; thence West 364.67 feet to the East
line of a frontage road at a point North
126.34 feet and East 232.33 feet from the
aforesaid Southwest section corner, thence
South 5°26f West 60.27 feet; thence East
-2-

370.38 feet to a P.C. of a curve to the
right, thence along the arc of said curve
25.09 feet to a P.R.C. center bearing South
8°32' West; thence along a curve to the left
25.09 feet to the P.T. ; thence East 190.23
feet; thence North 30.0 feet to the point of
beginning.
Together with a Right of Way over the following:
Beginning at a point which is South 89°48'40"
East 837.23 feet and North 65.37 feet from
the Southwest corner of Section 30, Township
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; and running thence South 18.87
feet; thence North 86047'18" West 21.17 feet;
thence North 75°00'45" West 25.77 feet;
thence North 83°15,22M West 58.09 feet;
thence North 84°10,28" West 29.87 feet;
thence North 88°38'58" West 26.56 feet;
thence North 82°27'50" West 4.14 feet; thence
East 164.09 feet to the point of beginning.
be and the same is hereby dissolved and terminated in order to
permit the eviction of the Debtor from said Property.

IW

DATED this

day of Peieuibec, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

GLEN E. CLARK
Bankruptcy Judge

J. DOWGLAS KINATEDER
Attorney for Debtor

CLARK W. SESSIONS
Attorney for Surety
Life Insurance Company
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
CLARK L. SNELSON (4673)
SESSIONS & MOORE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 359-4100

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

:
:
:
:

RESPONDENT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS APPEAL

:

MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM, HOWARD H. :
HUCKS, MARKWEST CORPORATION,
:
a California corporation,
:
and JOHN DOES I-X,
:

Case No. 890594-CA
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants and Appellants. :

COMES NOW Plaintiff

and Respondent, Surety Life

Insurance

Company ("Respondent"), by and through its undersigned counsel, and
moves

that

the Appeal

filed

in

the

above-referenced

case

be

dismissed for failure to comply with Rules 3, 6, 9(a), 11(e)(1),
and 11(e)(4) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

Respondent

also seeks to dismiss the Appeal pursuant to Rule 10(a)(2) and
seeks its costs and attorney's fees incurred herein.

Respondent

relies on Utah Supreme Court Rules 21, 34, and those above-cited,
as well as the accompanying Memorandum and Affidavit.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^

day of October, 1989

SESSIONS & MOORE

CLARK W. SESSIONS
Attorneys for Plaintiff

1092-80L.PL3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the £ V ^ d a y of October, 1989, the
foregoing RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL was served on
Defendants/Appellants by hand-delivering a true and correct copy
thereof to:
J. Douglas Kinateder, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 112
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

1092-80L.PL3
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
CLARK L. SNELSON (4673)
SESSIONS & MOORE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 359-4100

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS APPEAL

vs.
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM, HOWARD H.
HUCKS, MARKWEST CORPORATION,
a California corporation,
and JOHN DOES I-X,

Case No. 890594-CA
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants and Appellants.

COMES NOW Plaintiff and Respondent, Surety Life Insurance
Company ("Respondent"), by and through its undersigned counsel, and
submits the following Memorandum in Support of its Motion to
Dismiss this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 12, 1989, Judge Raymond S. Uno signed an Order denying
Defendant Howard K. Hucks and Markwest Corporation's Motion to Set
Aside the Default Judgment and denying the Motion of Melvin K.
Burningham to vacate or set aside summary judgment.

Defendants filed with the Utah Supreme Court a Notice of
Appeal dated June 15, 1989.

On August 14, 1989, the Clerk of the

Supreme Court, Geoffrey J. Butler, sent notice to Appellants'
counsel that the record in the case had not been filed, nor had a
transcript been ordered and paid for pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Appellants' counsel was advised
that failure to comply within ten days would result in dismissal
for failure to promptly pursue the appeal. By letter dated August
23, 1989, the Clerk of the Supreme Court sent notice to Appellants
that they were in default of Rule 9(a) which requires filing of a
Docketing Statement within 21 days of the filing of a Notice of
Appeal.

Again, notice was given that failure to cure the default

within 10 days would result in dismissal of the appeal.

On

September 12, 1989, Appellants were notified that their Docketing
Statement, filed nearly 3 months after their Notice of Appeal, was
deficient, and were given notice that failure to file an Amended
Docketing Statement correcting these deficiencies within 10 days
would result in dismissal of the appeal.
By letter dated October 6, 1989, Appellants were notified by
the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals that they were in default
for failure to file a Bond on Appeal and were asked to cure such
default immediately.

1092-80M.PL3
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STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Appellants have failed to comply with Rules 3, 6, 9(a),
11(e)(1), and 11(e)(4) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals,
and have failed on four separate occasions to heed the warning of
the Court that failure to cure these defaults would result in
dismissal of the appeal.
Rule 3(e) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court states: "The
party taking the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a Notice
of Appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to
counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order. . . .
Counsel for Respondent has not received a copy of the Notice of
Appeal, nor have they received a copy of any other pleading filed
by Appellants in the above-referenced case.

Respondent's first

notice that an appeal had been filed came nearly three months after
filing of the Notice of Appeal when counsel received a copy of the
notice sent by the Supreme Court that the case had been transferred
to the Court of Appeals. (See Affidavit of Clark Snelson, attached
hereto and incorporated by this reference herein.)
Rule 11(e) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court states that
"within ten (10) days after the filing of the Notice of Appeal,
Appellant shall request from the reporter a transcript. . . . The
request shall in writing and filed with the Clerk of the District
Court."

Appellants have failed as of the date of this Memorandum

to carry out their duty to see that the record is transcribed and

1092-80M.PL3
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transmitted
delay,

to t h e c o u r t .

the briefing

This

schedule

has delayed,

and continues to

and d i s p o s i t i o n

<

the

appeal.

D e s p i t e t h e C o u r t ' s notice that failure t o c o m p l y with this Rul e
would result

in

djL s m i. s s a i of t h e a p p e a l , A p p e l l a n t s have failed to

comply.
Not o n l y d i d A p p e l l a n t s
w i t h I i :i 2 ] day s

fail to file a D o c k e t i n g

as ;i • rr:: red b y Rule

Statement

9 , b u t they have

failed to

c o m p l y w i t h t h e Court 3 warning that failure to d o so w i t h i n ten
days

would

result

i11 d i s m i s s a l

of the a p p e a l .

fI ] 1 n g 1: £ the Docketi ng Statemen

Likewise,

upon

iq after the expi ra ti on of the

10-day g r a c e p e r i o d granted by tl i,e i!oiut., A p p e l l a n t s w e r e

again

n o t i f i e d that t/H- D o c k e t i n g Statement w a s d e f i c i e n t , and that such
defici
would

rected wi th i n ] 0 days
be d i s m i s s e d .

As

of

the date

of

::)i: tl 1 a t the appea II

the filing

M e m o r a n d u m , t h e r e is no Amended D o c k e t i n g Statement
the

Court.

F i n t hi'Litiui e , App* 1 ! I m i t *

tdiilure

of

th Is

o n file w i t h
n/up 1 i> \k- n t

I n ,i< 1 \n

t h e i r N o t i c e of A p p e a l a n d D o c k e t i n g S t a t e m e n t u p o n counsel for
R e s p o n d e n t d e p r i v e d R e s p o n d e n t of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y tc rile ,i "notion
piirR 1.1 a n l
on

1 r in 11» 1111 I 1«

appeal

Court.

I (1 ( r 1 |i 1 ;' |i t 11 d i srai s s t o r f a 1 J111 r e :

of s u f f i c i e n t

merit

to justify

consideration

,
b y the

R e s p o n d e n t seeks leave of t h e Court to file such a motion
fif H '

instant motion.

1092-80M.PL3
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ci,:i s r a i s s a 1

1 111 I h e

A p p e 11 a n \ s

'hia"/- • * a I !

PC;I

1 '" J » OIUJ. > I ":' u i-11 «-t i»v,

f- t i n -

t u IH

governing filing of appeals In the instant case; they have failed
to request a transcript within 10 days as required by Rule 1 1 , and
a s yet: ii f r a r i s n nil

I'M . mil b o o n

f I 1 P«1 ; 1 h p y h a v p

trnlf1*! I;,«» fi ] e

a Docketing Statement within 21 days as required by Rule 9, and as
yet there is no adequate Docketing Statement on fi]e; they have
fail eci to fi ] e a Boi id a s reqi i I i: e d b y Ri :i Il 6 • 6
been filed; they have filed to serve Notice u
counsel as required by Rule

u>d in * ^<?t

a i i I a s ] $ <= 1 : i i
Appeal on opposing

* ,ive failed *r serve
Supreme

Court of Appeals upon opposing counsel,

Respondent's Motion is

based on more than a single technical failure to comply with the
Rules.

It i

i|i outncli »< I u p o n

d general

il i s u?cj<ini lui Ih*1 b'mlkvi nt

Appellate Procedure manifest by Appellants in this case

While

dismissal for failure to comply with the above-referenced rules is
ijii'iii'lw exi.- 1

t ho ' V u ' i , iHequd*.e

,l

ill HCi etionai'Y

with

' «lihiiiihs

this appeal,

See Rule 9(f); see also Mountain States Telegraph &

Telephone Co, v. Atkins, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258
|i

(Utah
appeal

»oi

< «">
•

,| ,,I||IV d i s m i s s
10(a)(2)

lui lijiluio

(failure

to

state

tu lilo
grounds

mi II i I
l
for

on

appeal

sufficient to meri t review of the Cou rt j
Respondent.!.

pi: e j u d i c u d

by" Ap|>e I lam!! b " f <n I u n j s

Failure to notify Respondent of the Notice of Appeal has misled
Respondent into believing that the matter was final and that no
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S

further legal action or ] egaJ costs would be required,

Failure to

file a timely and adequate Docketing Statement and to serve a copy
thereon on Respondent deprived Respondent of the opportunity to
challenge the sufficiency of the a I 1 eqaf/ei ens 01 1 appea ] and tc have
the appeal dismissed on that ground months, prior to the f i 1 1 ng of
this Motion.

The delay in filing request for records and in other

filings made by Appe3 ] ai 1 1::s 1 la v e :ie] a y e d ai id c :>:i i t:i ni le tc del ay the
determination of this action.
Dismissal

of the appeal

is appropriate

not just

for the

prejudice si if fered bj Respoi idei its |( I: i i I: because Appel 1 ants

act , • -

have demonstrated total disregard not only for the procedures of
the

Court

but. for

its power.

On

four

A p p e 1 1 1\ n t" s w * e e

11 ie > <-» 11 n u t e e m l \ I H • i i

an

to cure

opportunity

their

separate

occasions,

f a i I u i i • i 11 i i iiiii 111 | a n d j i v \ * 11

defaults,

with

the warning

that

failure to do so would result in dismissal of the appeal , Yet ., i n
each

instance , AppeJ I rent s h<e/e e i 1 hei f «J L J ed

Court's requirements in a timely fashion

omp] y wi t::„l i the

r r.o comply at all.

Such

actions show contempt for the Court, and its procedures and should
not

f

. ., .

practices

r»t- .v.ir: undermines

^

u

respect and authority.

Based upon the foregoing, Respondent respectfully

requests

t licit tins appea I IIM *\ \,( en sseil ^n«i llhi' i^^spoiiiienl. IHJ dwditle«i| its
costs and attorney's fees incurred in bringing this Motion.

1092-80M.PL3
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day of
oJ October, 1989.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this P
y YY day
SESSIONS h MUUNK

1092-80M.PL3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the XV"4i day of October, J 9 89, the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
APPEAL was served <vi Defendants/Appellants by hand-delivering a
true and correct

CO py

thereof to:

J B Douglas Kinateder, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 1]2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

&*?*>&
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
onl) 10

Surety Life Insurance Company, I
a Utah corporator
1
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)

NOTICE OF STATUS
CONFERENCE

)
v.

Case No. 890594-CA

Melvin K. Burninaham, Markwest
Corporation, a California
/
corporation, and John Does
)
I-X,
)

)
Defendant and Appellant.

)

This matter is before the court on its own motion pursuant
to R. Utah Ct. App. 28. On December 20, 1989, appellant Melvin
Keith Burningham filed a Reply to Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss Appeal, which represents that appellant has filed a
Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy.
United States Bankruptcy Code § 362(a) imposes an automatic
stay as of the filing of any bankruptcy petition. To date,
this court has received no further information regarding the
bankruptcy.
The parties to the appeal are hereby requested to appear it
a conference before the Honorable Richard C. Davidson in his
chambers at 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah
at 1:30 p.m. on January 24, 1990, to inform the court of the
status of the bankruptcy and pending appeal.
DATED this
I i ii i HI

T

day ot January, 1990.

rniiu r•

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of January, 1990,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE
was deposited in the United States mail.
J. Douglas Kinateder
Attorney at Law
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 112
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Clark W. Sessions
Sessions & Moore
Attorneys at Law
404 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
DATED this 9th day of January, 1990.

By ^y^'/f/tvu

>

Deputy ClerJ^

^s
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FILED
—

-FEB_2 61391

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Surety Life Insurance Company,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Melvin K Burningham, Markwest
Corporation, a California
corporation, and John Does I-X,

NOTICE OF SUA SPONTE
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT
FOR SIJMMARY DISPOSITION
Case No, 890594-CA

Defendant and Appellant.
TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:
The above-captioned appeal is being considered •>
d i s m i s s a II \ 11 I < :1 e r R

1 J t a 1 I CI

summary

I \ p p . 1 0 (€ •) lb e c a u s e

m o o t as a result of d e f e n d a n t ' s d i s c h a r g e

w bankruptcy.

In

lieu of -» b r i e f , y o u a r e r e q u e s t e d to f j " - * m e m o r a n d u m , not to
exceeo

p a g e s , explai ni ng w h y t h e a p p e a l shou 1 d • :>i: sI io\ I] d i iot

b e d i s m i s s e d as m o o t .
A n or igi na i an(j

four copies of the memorandum should be

filed with the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals on or before
Monday, March 11, 1991.

DATED this 25th day of February, 1991

•\/-\ v> ~\ r%

^***m

Mary T/ Noonan
ClerKv/utah Court of Appeals

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of February, 1991, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF SUA SPONTE
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION was
hand-delivered or deposited in the United States mail.
J. Douglas Kinateder
Attorney at Law
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 112
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Clark W. Sessions
Sessions & Moore
Attorneys at Law
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1605
DATED this 26th day of February, 1991.

DeptftyTcIerK

